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Abstract
A natural propensity was found which indicates that most agricultural producers believe
their land will be operated by one or more of their children when they retire. But results
also indicate that producers will be responsive to selling their land for development if
urban housing offers a higher return.
Tronstad and Osgood are associate and assistant professors at the University of Arizona,
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. Young is Co-Director of FAPRI at
the University of Missouri, Department of Agricultural Economics.2
Transition of Agricultural Land Ownership and Use
Farmland preservation legislation has surfaced or been enacted near several populated
urban centers. Arguments for keeping land in agriculture on urban fringes range from
open space and scenic vistas to preservation of rural lifestyles and having a “safety-
valve” for urban water requirements. Given that agriculture and urban centers compete
with each other for water and land but can also compliment each other the debate
regarding farmland preservation is likely to continue. From 1954 to 1992, urban land use
increased from 18.6 to 58.0 million acres (Daugherty). While urban land use in 1992 only
represented 12.6% of all cropland, the continued increase in urban relative to agricultural
land use has been a concern for many individuals and political action groups.
Blank recently examined the issue of why land is leaving agriculture considering
minimum financial obligations, lifestyle desires, and an opportunity cost or risk premium
of farmers. The notion that farmers and ranchers are willing to accept a lower rate of
return in order to preserve lifestyle has been around for some time (Brewster; Martin and
Jeffries). He argued that producers get “squeezed up the Farming Food Chain” in order to
stay in agriculture and/or seek higher rates of return. This occurs by farmers moving from
producing low-value annual crops (e.g., cotton, corn, and rice) to at least some acreage of
low-value perennial crops (e.g., alfalfa hay) then high-value annual crops (e.g., broccoli,
carrots, and lettuce) and finally high-value perennial crops (e.g., almonds, grapes,
oranges, plums, walnuts). Blank proposes that crops increase in risk and return as farmers3
move up the Farming Food Chain. External shocks that decrease the profitability of
farming force producers to either select a more profitable and risky portfolio or shift at
least some assets out of agriculture, including land. However, land capable of producing
the highest category of the Farming Food Chain can leave agriculture before the land
owner tries these tree fruit and vine crops.
Utilizing county level data, Goetz and Debertin recently quantified how off-farm
income and other explanatory variables effect the propensity of U.S. farmers to cease
farming. An OLS analysis of all counties suggests that off-farm income has no statistical
effect on the number of farmers quitting between 1987 and 1997. But a more elaborate
model that separates counties that have gained farmers with those that have lost farmers
revealed more subtle and less clear-cut effects on off-farm income. High rates of off-farm
income reduce the odds of losing farmers and increase the odds of keeping the same
number of farmers. But their results also showed that higher rates of off-farm income
tend to accelerate the loss of farms, creating a counteracting effect. They also found that
farmers tend to quit at a lower rate if they operate their own farm. Farmers quit at faster
rates if the value of their land and buildings is high, they receive more government
program payments, or they reside in a county or are adjacent to a county with a high
population density.
In comparing the determinants of farm exits from Israel and Canada, Kimi and
Bollman found the odds of farmers quitting to decline if they have off-farm employment.4
But Kimhi also revealed that Israeli farmers seeking to exit from agriculture within the
next decade were less likely to work off-farm on a full employment basis. Off-farm
employment is closely related to farm survival since it accounts for 53% of the average
farm operator’s household income, up from 23% in 1945 (Goetz and Debertin).
Prior literature on the transition of agricultural lands to nonfarm use and the
consolidation of agricultural lands has had a crop portfolio or off-farm income focus with
an underlying annual return series that determines risks and returns. But most land
ownership transitions to the next operator or nonfarm use probably follow more of a life-
cycle earnings framework given that many older operators have low nonfarm
employment opportunities due to the time needed to develop skills in an alternative trade.
Given that 55 percent of the principal farm operators in the U.S. are 55 years of age, what
producers anticipate will happen to their operation when they retire could be very helpful
for policy makers and tax payers in the farmland preservation debate. Thus, the principal
objective of this analysis is to quantify how the factors of age, education, nonfarm
income, crop mix, technology, value of land for nonfarm use, land ownership, financial
health, and heritage influence what agricultural producers anticipate will happen to their
operation when they retire.5
Data and Methods
The data to be used in this analysis is from a mail survey that was conducted in
April of 2001 as a part of the “2001 National Agricultural, Food, and Public Policy
Preference Survey.” This study analyzes responses from the two states of Arizona (AZ)
and Missouri (MO). Like many western states, AZ has been at the forefront of percentage
population growth for the U.S. MO has farmland next to two large urban centers (St.
Louis and Kansas City) and many rural areas, similar to much of the midwest. In
addition, these were two states that asked an optional question surrounding technology
adoption that reflects the level of investment in agricultural lands. The survey instrument
and information regarding the average and overall composite responses of large
(>$100,000 in agricultural sales) and small farms for all 27 participating states is
available in Lubben et al.
The mail survey was conducted by the agricultural statistics services associated
with Arizona and Missouri using a random sampling of both small and large farm strata.
A post-card reminder to complete the survey was mailed to all addresses about 2 weeks
after the survey was sent out. A response rate of 20% and 16% was obtained for Arizona
and Missouri. A total of 113 and 704 responses were received from Arizona and
Missouri, but only 513 (416 and 97 from AZ and MO) of these 817 respondents
completed all the questions utilized in this analysis. The dependent variable for our
analysis is derived from the question of “When I retire, I expect the farm or ranch I6
operate to: a) be operated by one or more of my children, b) be operated by a relative
who is not one of my children, c) be operated by someone unrelated to my family but
currently involved in the operation, d) be transferred to individuals outside of the current
operation, or e) be converted to nonfarm use.
Given that factors which influence the transfer of land ownership to children also
impact whether land is transferred to nonfarm use, we hypothesize that an ordered
response will exist for the five responses. That is, the most extreme response for land
ownership to maintain its current status is to have land ownership transferred to children
and the most dramatic change is for land to transition to nonfarm use. The three responses
of transferring land to a relative, to someone unrelated but currently involved in the
operation, and to individuals outside of the current operation fall between the two
extremes of transferring land to children or nonfarm use. Thus, an ordered probit model
which is cast in terms of a latent continuous random variable with five possible discrete
values was used to estimate the dependent variable of land transition (LTi) expected
when operators retire (LT). The ordered probit model is given by
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* is the operator’s unobserved land transition propensity, LTi is the operator’s
observed land transition propensity, b0  through b17 and m3 through m5are unknown
parameters to be estimated, and ei is a random variable with a normal distribution. The
ordered probit model is well defined only for mk greater than zero.
Explanatory variables are as follows: DSTATEi equals 1 if the respondent is from
Arizona and 0 if from Missouri. The percentage of cash receipts obtained from fruits and
tree nuts (PRFATNi); dairy (PRDAIRY i); vegetables, pulses and other crops (PRVPOi);
forage crops (PRFORi); cotton, rice, tobacco, sugar, and peanut crops (PRCRTSP i); and
wheat, forage, and oil crops (PRWFOi) -- livestock of pork, beef, sheep, and poultry
make out the remainder of all cash receipts.  AGEi equals 1 through 6 if the age of the
principal operator is under 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 and over. Education
(EDUCi) is quantified from 1 through 6 by using the last year of school completed by the
principal operator as either grade school, some high school, high school diploma, some
college, college Bachelor’s degree, and an advanced college degree. TINTERi equals the
number (0 to 2) of Internet related technologies (Internet for E-commerce transactions8
and/or to collect information to manage risk) used by the respondent. TGRREGi indicates
the number of technologies (0 to 6) used by the operator regarding the following:
herbicide-tolerant crops, seed multiplied (increased) through tissue culture technology,
genetically-modified seed, plant growth stimulants and regulators, insect growth
regulators, and livestock production stimulants such as shots and implants. Responses
regarding the use of precision irrigation (laser leveling, drip irrigation and low-pressure
sprinkler systems), and precision agriculture (e.g., global positioning systems, variable
rate applications) make up the variable of TPREAGi (0 to 2).
EQUITYi equals 1 if the operator had to draw on existing farm or personal equity
to finance their farm or ranch in the past 3 years and 0 otherwise. The percentage of land
operated by the respondent that is owned equals PLOWNi. PHIF i equals the percentage
of household or family income that the respondent typically earns from farming or
ranching. The generation (including spouse’s family) the current operator represents on
this farm or ranch is defined by NGENi. The opportunity cost of keeping land in farming
or ranching is quantified using the median monthly rental price (MEDRENTi, 1992
Census data) for the county that the operator resides in. MEDRENTi ranges from $118 to
$397 and has an average of $208.
The percentage of cash receipts obtained from crop and livestock mixes provide
insight into what level producers are at in the “Farming Food Chain” and the degree that9
government subsidies influence land transition decisions. Crops like cotton, rice, tobacco,
sugar, and peanuts have historically received more payments than commodity crops of
wheat, feedgrain, and oilseed crops on an absolute and relative percentage basis. The
level of management associated with alternative crop mixes is captured by the number of
technologies utilized in their operation (i.e., TINTERi, TGRREGi, and TPREAGi).
EQUITYi identifies operations that are facing financial and profit difficulties by having to
draw on existing farm or personal equity to finance their operation in the past 3 years.
PLOWNi may also reflect financial health related to cash flow but it probably mainly
reflects the security offered to children in making their career as a farmer or rancher.
AGEi, EDUCi, and PHIF i influence the ability of an agricultural operator to possibly
retire from farming at an earlier age than otherwise and capitalize on nonfarm
employment opportunities. The extent that agricultural producers have a desire to pass on
their operations to their own children through heritage or tradition is measured by both
the constant term of b0 and the number of generations the operation has already been
owned within the family (NGENi). How Ricardian or responsive producers will be to
rents offered by urbanization or nonfarm land use is proxied by the median monthly
rental value for the county the operator resides in (MEDRENTi).10
Empirical Results
Many variables were found to be statistically significant for explaining what
producers feel will happen to their land when they retire and they are reported in table 1.
First, high significance of the ordered response variables of m3, m4, and m5 (all having p-
values of 0.000) suggest that the ordered probit framework is appropriate for the data.
The positive constant term of b0 is on par in statistical significance with the ordered
response variables, indicating that most operations plan to pass their operation on to their
children. However, the next most statistically prominent factor is the monthly median
rental value or MEDRENTi. The negative sign associated with MEDRENTi indicates that
producers will respond to higher nonfarm rents for their land in the future by selling to
urban developers or other nonfarm use.
The positive sign for DSTATEi indicates that producers in Arizona are more
likely to keep their land in agriculture than Missouri producers, ceteris paribus. This
result could be attributed to two different factors. First, farmland preservation legislation
has recently surfaced in Arizona’s legislature that would pay development rights to
producers so that they could keep farming near the Phoenix metro area. Secondly,
roughly 80% of the state of Arizona is federal, state, or Native American owned, making
the transition of lands into nonfarm use much more rigid than in Missouri. For example,
the Gila River Indian Tribes reservation near the Phoenix metro area has housing11
developments on their north and southern boundaries. Yet agriculture land has actually
increased on this reservation due to federal water right settlements. Many ranchers in
Arizona operate almost exclusively on public lands, yet their grazing leases are fairly
secure since they are tied to small private land holdings that they own. The percentage of
land owned that the operator farms or ranches (PLOWNi) is positive and statistically
significant as well (p-value of 0.023). This most likely reflects the notion that owning a
larger percentage of land in the operation reduces uncertainty, which attracts children into
farming or ranching as a career..
The significant and negative sign of EDUCi indicates that producers with more
education are less likely to pass their operation on to their children and more likely to sell
out their land to nonfarm uses at retirement. More educated producers probably have
more educated children so that nonfarm employment opportunities are probably greater
for their children than less educated operators. In addition, more educated producers are
probably more aware, able, and willing to respond to nonfarm investment opportunities.
Operators that obtain a higher percentage of their family income from the farm (PHIF i)
are more likely to pass the farm onto their children than those that depend more on
nonfarm income. However, PHIF i is marginally significant with a p-value of 0.114.
AGEi indicates that older operators believe the land in their operation is more likely to
move to someone outside of their family or to nonfarm use. This result may reflect that a12
higher percentage of young farmers operate large farms than small farms and that the
children of older operators may already be employed in nonfarm activities. Thus, older
operators realize that the farm is less attractive to their children and they are more
conducive to selling their land for nonfarm use.
In general, results do not support the Farming Food Chain or the notion that
farmers with a high-value crop mix are more likely to survive. In fact, the last
development stage of tree fruit and nut crops (PRFATNi) identified by Blank with very
high investment and highly fixed asset structure has a statistically significant negative
sign. Tree fruit and nut crops have high labor requirements and foreign competition with
cheaper labor is driving the return of these crops down, in spite of their highly fixed
investment structure. Thus, operators with a high percent of their revenues obtained from
fruit and tree nuts (PRFATNi) are not optimistic that their land will be able to be
competitive with urban development pressures relative to beef, pork, and poultry
livestock operations. In fact some nut producers in AZ have been known to maintain their
trees without nut production so that their land will be more attractive for housing
developments.
The only other statistically significant crop mix variable is wheat, feed grain, and
oilseed crops (PRWFOi) which has a p-value of 0.020. The positive sign of PRWFOi
could reflect that many of these producers hope to survive in farming by moving further13
up the Farming Food Chain, but it may also reflect that these operators believe their
operation will be one of the future low-cost world producers for these commodities.
Mechanization, large-scale farming practices, and rich natural soil and water resources
favor the production of these commodities which primarily reside in MO. Operations
with commodities that are highly dependent on government subsidies like cotton, rice,
tobacco, sugar, peanuts (PRCRTSP i), and dairy (PRDAIRY i) appear to be no more likely
to keep their land in agriculture in the future than those dependent on forage (PRFORi)
and vegetable crops (PRVPOi). Furthermore, EQUITYi, which reflects the financial
health of the operation was not a significant factor either, suggesting that few farmers and
ranchers are actually being “squeezed out” of agriculture.
Technology use of the operator quantified by TINTERi, TGRREGi, and TPREAGi
should reflect the level of sophistication, asset fixity, and variable cost structure of the
operation. That is, greater technology use should reflect a lower marginal cost structure.
However, technology use was found to be rather marginal and negative at influencing the
land transition decision. The most statistically significant technology component is
TINTERi with a p-value of 0.113. The negative sign associated with technology seems to
indicate that those which are progressive with respect to adopting and taking advantage
of new technologies also have little hesitation about transitioning their land to nonfarm
use or someone outside their family if returns warrant these decisions.14
Concluding Remarks
This analysis looks at how agricultural lands will transition to another operator or
nonfarm use by asking current operators what they anticipate will happen to their land
when they retire using the “Producer Preferences for the 2002 Farm Bill” mail survey.
This approach fits with a life cycle earnings framework, suggesting that most older
operators will not transition out of agriculture until they retire. Responses considered
were for land transitioning to nonfarm use, someone outside the current operation but
staying in agriculture production, a non-relative that is involved with the current
operation, a relative that is not their child, and finally one of their children. Results
suggest that an ordered probit framework is appropriate for the above responses.
Overall we find little support for the notion of the Farming Food Chain proposed
by Blank or that producers get squeezed into growing at least some higher value crops in
order to stay in agriculture. While there is a natural propensity and desire for farm land to
be operated by one or more of their children when they retire, producers indicate that they
will also be responsive to selling their land for development if urban housing offers a
higher return. No evidence was found to support the notion that more off-farm income
will keep land in agriculture longer than otherwise. Like Goetz and Debertin, results
indicate that farms adjacent to metropolitan areas or in counties with high median rental
rates are most likely to transition their land out of agriculture. While Goetz and Debertin
found that counties with higher government payments lose farmers at a faster rate than15
counties with lower government payments, we found little relation between crops that
historically have received the highest subsidies and the operators anticipation of their
land’s use when they retire.
Farmland preservation has been around for sometime and continues to surface. If
farmers and ranchers follow more of a life-cycle earnings behavior in exiting agriculture
than an expected annual return and risk framework, an unusually large number of farms
and ranches will transfer in ownership and/or use in the next decade. Policy makers
should be informed as to how producers anticipate their current agricultural lands will be
able to compete with international competitors and nonfarm land uses. Given that 55% of
the principal farm operators are 55 years of age or older, the next decade appears critical
for influencing farm preservation or open space legislation.16
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Table 1.  Estimated Land Transition Equation Estimates from the Ordered Probit Model
Variable Estimates Standard Errors P —values
INTERCEPT 2.0648 0.4533 0.000
DSTATE (0 MO, 1 AZ) 0.5720 0.2111 0.007
PRFATN -0.0069 0.0039 0.078
PRDAIRY -0.0014 0.0049 0.778
PRVPO 0.0015 0.0024 0.539
PRFOR -0.0028 0.0028 0.303
PRCRTSP -0.0015 0.0038 0.685
PRWFO 0.0040 0.0017 0.020
AGE -0.0968 0.0508 0.057
EDUC -0.1059 0.0469 0.024
TINTER -0.1454 0.0915 0.113
TGRREG -0.0564 0.0419 0.178
TPREAG -0.1663 0.1354 0.219
EQUITY 0.0183 0.1157 0.874
PLOWN 0.0989 0.0434 0.023
PHIF 0.0728 0.0461 0.114
NGEN 0.0383 0.0483 0.428
MEDRENT -0.0032 0.0010 0.001
m3 0.7824 0.0695 0.000
m4 0.9302 0.0728 0.000
m5 1.0603 0.0752 0.000
Log-likelihood -580.604
Sample size 513
Notes: m3, m4, and m5 are threshold parameters associated with the ordered probit model.
The 5 ordered responses were obtained from the question of, ￿When I retire, I expect the
farm or ranch I operate to: 1) be converted to a nonfarm use, 2) be transferred to
individuals outside of the current operation, 3) be operated by someone unrelated to my
family but currently involved in the operation, 4) be operated by a relative who is not one
of my children, 5) be operated by one or more of my children..￿ The response frequency
was 60, 104, 26, 24, and 299 for 1 through 5.